Insider threats often target authentication and access control systems, which are frequently based on directory services. Detecting these threats is challenging, because malicious users with the technical ability to modify these structures often have sufficient knowledge and expertise to conceal unauthorized activity. The use of directory virtualization to monitor various systems across an enterprise can be a valuable tool for detecting insider activity. The addition of a policy engine to directory virtualization services enhances monitoring capabilities by allowing greater flexibility in analyzing changes for malicious intent. The resulting architecture is a system-based approach, where the relationships and dependencies between data sources and directory services are used to detect an insider threat, rather than simply relying on point solutions. This paper presents such an architecture in detail, including a description of implementation results.
INTRODUCTION
Detecting malicious insider activity on enterprise systems is a challenging task, which is further compounded if the insider activity is perpetuated by entities with administrative access to many of the enterprise resources. One of the most widely used services in enterprise systems is directory services, which provide information pertaining to users, computers, contacts, and other objects. This information may be provided to end-users, for informational purposes, or to adjacent services which may use the information to make access control decisions. Because of the importance of directory services and the role they play in access control, they are a favorite target of malicious entities seeking to gain unauthorized access to internal resources.
Because auditing capabilities are often located on the same source device as the directory services, they may also be circumvented by an attacker with administrative access to the machine. Thus, the capability to perform external monitoring is critical to detecting and responding to malicious insider activity. Solutions exist to monitor suspicious activity on individual items such group membership and audit logs, but these solutions are fairly limited in scope, monitoring only for status changes or specific event occurrences.
We are motivated by the need for monitoring the overall integrity of directory services. Additionally, we desire to conduct such monitoring activity from a source separate from the directory service itself. Furthermore, we feel the creation of a more complex, policy-based approach to insider activity detection could greatly benefit administrators seeking to protect their data from unauthorized access.
In this paper, we present a comprehensive solution for detecting insider activity in directory services. By enhancing the capabilities of directory virtualization technology, we show how to combine monitoring with policy, allowing a more robust and flexible detection mechanism. Also, we show how our solution is lightweight, allowing it to be easily deployed for multiple data sources, and enabling multiple monitoring points to be established easily.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information on insider threats, directory services, and directory virtualization. Section 3 details our approach, and Section 4 discusses potential application scenarios, as well as test implementation results. Section 5 presents a discussion on advantages, limitations, and attacks against the architecture. Section 6 concludes this paper with a discussion of future work.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
Directories are collections of information related to objects in an organization. These objects often include users, computers, or contacts. Directory Services are the services which make this data available for use by others. Frequently, the intention is to provide a single point of access for various applications and individuals to find information about users and other objects for different purposes, including collaboration within/across organizations. The information contained within the directory may come from direct input, and can be manually maintained, but also may be referenced and managed indirectly by other corporate data repositories, such as databases and other information stores.
Directory services may also be used to provide additional services to applications and domains, such as authentication and access control. By specifying a user's identity, and associating a password, directory services are able to authenticate users and provide credentials about users to other services. Additionally, by specifying attributes such as group membership or other identifying features (such as citizenship, clearance level, management level, etc.,) the information in directory services can be used to make access control decisions. Common directory services implementations include Microsoft Active Directory [8] , Sun Java System Directory Server [12] , IMB Tivoli Directory Server [5] , Novell eDirectory [14] , Fedora Directory Server [19] , and OpenLDAP [15] .
Virtual Directories
"A virtual directory functions as an abstraction layer between applications and data repositories." [17] In contrast to metadirectories, virtual directories do not maintain data in a standalone data source. Rather, virtual directories reference various data sources and present a consolidated view to the end user. This has the advantage of not requiring data synchronization; data presented is always real-time, directly from the source.
The capability to access multiple data sources simultaneously gives virtual directory implementations the opportunity to provide several other information-related services. These include, but are not limited to, acquiring data from sources other than directories (such as databases,) combining information from multiple data sources, limiting the amount of data presented to end users, modifying information prior to delivery to end users, synchronizing information between data sources, and providing high-speed, highavailability directory services by utilizing a local cache of information on the virtual directory server itself. The core components of virtual directory services are shown in Figure 1 . Most of these components are not utilized in our architecture, for more details, please refer to existing literature [3, 18, 16, 23] . Common virtual directory providers include Radiant Logic RadiantOne [18] , Oracle Virtual Directory Service [16] , and Symlabs Virtual Directory Service [23] .
Attacks
Attacks on directory services and virtual directory services can take several forms, and may originate from outside an organization, or inside an organization, by regular users, or even administrators. These attacks range from simply stealing information from a directory, either using existing security loopholes or by gaining administrative access to the host machine and taking data directly from the source, to more complicated attacks involving spoofing, data redirection, data manipulation, and others. [1, 2, 3] .
Insider Attacks
Directory services are particularly susceptible to attacks by users within an organization, or insiders. Of particular concern are users with administrative access to authoritative directory sources, virtual directory services, or both. We refer to these as dedicated administrative insiders. The threat of unauthorized access of sensitive data by employees or other authorized users, is well documented [7, 6, 21] . In January 2008, the U.S. Secret Service and CERT issued a report titled "Insider Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Activity in the Government Sector" [7] . This study outlines a multiyear project, started in 2002, that explores the activity and threats posed by insiders. Among the key findings of this study are the following:
• Most of the insiders had authorized access at the time of their malicious activities
• Access control gaps facilitated most of the insider incidents, including:
-The ability of an insider to use technical methods to override access controls without detection -System vulnerabilities that allowed technical insiders to use their specialized skills to override access controls without detection
When considering the profile of an dedicated administrative insider, it is important to note that this entity could originate from different sources. The user could be an existing legitimate administrator seeking to compromise, steal, or tamper with company information for personal gain. Or, the user could be an outside attacker who has successfully compromised the enterprise systems and gained access to an administrative account. In the first case, the user is much more likely to know about existing detection mechanisms and countermeasures, as well as how to defeat them. In the second case, the user would not have such extensive knowledge, and may be easier to detect.
Anatomy of an Attack
To better illustrate the motivation behind our work, let us consider three scenarios where dedicated administrative insiders modify directory services information to gain unauthorized access. With a firm understanding of the motivation and techniques behind such attacks, the details of our solution will be more clear.
Create a New User.
One way an insider might choose to compromise data would be to create a new user in the directory. Doing so would allow the impersonation of a legitimate user without triggering possible alarms with the use of an administrative account. The attacker could then set attributes of the new object at will, including those used for access control decisions such as clearance or group membership.
Change Group Membership.
Suppose access to a particular resource is controlled by an access control list (ACL) which specifies only members of a specific security group (contained in the corporate directory services) are allowed access. To gain access, an insider only needs to modify the membership of the security group to include an unauthorized account. Reset User Password.
Alternatively, the insider (with administrative privileges) could reset the password of an existing authorized group member, and then masquerade as that user. This would circumvent typical detection tools that look for group membership changes to trigger alerts of suspected insider activity. This would also defeat mechanisms that monitor directory services for unauthorized accounts.
OUR APPROACH
The architecture we propose for detecting insider activity in directory services is based on a new component we call the Malicious Activity Detection Engine (MADE). MADE is essentially an enhanced directory virtualization service (DVS), as it builds on DVS core components (shown in Figure 1 ). Our entire architecture, including MADE, is shown in Figure 2. Our contribution is the addition of policy components that interact with outside policy information and authoritative data sources to enable us to make decisions based on information collected by the core virtualization service. This architecture is described in detail below.
Core Components
MADE utilizes various core DVS components to gain access, retrieve, and process directory services data as necessary for the specific task. For instance, it may monitor for specific combinations of states from multiple data sources, or it may need to transform the monitored data based on other criteria. Or, we may want to communicate with data sources other than directory services to collect monitoring information. In those cases, MADE would use other core components such as transformation. We also rely on components such as security and administration to allow configuration and access to the monitored data sources. Only two core components of DVS are integrated directly into the MADE architecture: virtualization and synchronization.
Virtualization
The core component most important to our architecture is the virtualization component. This is responsible for interfacing with target directory services, maintaining connectivity, and preparing data for change detection by the synchronization component. If data needs to be combined, transformed, or filtered, the virtualization component handles these actions. Another important feature is the ability to interface with multiple data sources simultaneously, and provide a consolidated view to the synchronization service.
Synchronization
The synchronization component is responsible for detecting changes in the directory services data. This component receives data from the virtualization component and compares it to previously acquired data. Differences such as modifications, additions, or deletions are noted and passed along to the policy decision point.
Building on Core Components
On top of the core components, we add two additional components: the policy enforcement point and policy decision point. These components are described below.
Policy Decision Point
The policy decision point (PDP) is an additional component added to handle the task of deciding whether activity gathered by the virtualization component is malicious. Data received from the virtualization and synchronization components includes information such as new accounts being added to the directory, monitored attributes changing on an object (or multiple objects), or group membership being modified. Once an event is detected, the PDP also obtains appropriate policy information from authoritative data sources and the policy information point (PIP), which is a repository of account-related policies. Using the combination of data and policies, the PDP makes a determination regarding the activity monitored. Responses may include deciding that the activity is permissible or not permissible. If not permissible, the PDP notifies the policy enforcement point (PEP) to alert administrators. Or, the PDP may be unable to reach a definitive conclusion, and can react according to corporate policy, which would determine whether an administrator should be notified or not.
Modeling the Problem
We model the policy decision process as a Boolean func- tion of several components describing the state of an account and the relationships with other data sources. If all the conditions satisfy the requirements of the PDP, that is, they are true, then the policy requirements are met, and no malicious intent is detected. We show the function as si ≡ sj (a1, a2, . . . , aj) . This is modeled as a conjunction, that is sj (a1, a2, . . . , aj) = 1 implies a1 = 1, a2 = 1, . . . , aj = 1. If disjunctive conditions exist, i.e. either condition a1 or a2 must be true, they can be included in separate conjunctive states.
Conditions can take on a variety of forms. A condition may be the value (or merely presence) of a specific attribute on an account, the membership of an account in a particular group 1 , or the existence of a relationship between two objects (and the specific attributes of those objects) in different data sources.
As an example, consider the situation where an unauthorized account is created. We can say that a policy exists which specifies the following state for new accounts: snew acct(aX , aY , aZ ) where aX is the presence of the account record in an personnel data source X, aY is an "active" status pertaining to that account in an account data source Y , and aZ is the presence of specific training records for the owner of the account in a training database Z. If any of these conditions do not hold for a newly generated account, the state would return false, and the account could be considered malicious.
Policy Enforcement Point
Once a decision on the state is reached by the PDP, a message is relayed to the PEP, which is responsible for executing any action that needs to be taken in response to the activity. For instance, newly created unauthorized accounts could be removed, group membership restored, attributes corrected, or administrators could be notified for further review and action. Depending on architecture, the PEP may not actually have authorization to make changes to the directory service, particularly if the virtualization component is used to monitor many different data sources simultaneously.
APPLICATION
Let us revisit the example scenarios of malicious insider activity against directory services, posed in Section 2.2.2. We will show how our architecture addresses those concerns by describing implementation instances demonstrating realworld usage of our model. We implemented systems to monitor various types of systems, thus showing both responsiveness and flexibility. The first system monitors for unauthorized accounts. The second is a detection mechanism that monitors a domain administrators group. Finally, to show the value of relationships in policy-based decisions, we show a system that monitors various relationships between accounts across multiple directory services, specifically focusing on attributes used to make access control decisions by other applications.
Create a New User
In the first example scenario, a malicious insider creates a new user with the intent to access to an unauthorized resource. We can define a policy, applied to all accounts, to prevent this type of action, as follows:
In this case, a auth acct is a condition that states the account must have an associated record in an authorized data source. We then use MADE to monitor for and respond to discrepancies to this policy.
The first component in detection of this activity is the virtualization service, which monitors the directory service either on a fixed interval or based on triggers associated with directory service activity. In either case, the new account information is collected by the virtualization service, modified if necessary, and passed along to the synchronization service. The synchronization service compares the incoming data with previously collected data and identifies the new account. This action is reported to the PDP. Upon notification, the PDP first requests information from an authoritative account database, which holds records of all authorized accounts in the enterprise. Next, it requests information from the PIP, which holds the policy requirements for account creation. The PIP responds with a policy stating that all accounts must have an associated record in the authoritative database. Because the newly created account does not have an associated record, a auth acct is false, and the activity is deemed malicious. The PIP also states that any account without an associated record should be disabled immediately, and administrators notified. Based on this, the PDP instructs the PEP to disable the account and notify administrators of the malicious activity.
The system implemented to test all scenarios described in this section was constructed as follows. A simple DVS was written using Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 to interact with any LDAP [4] directory service. Specifically, we used Microsoft Active Directory [8] and Sun Java System Directory Server [12] . Additionally, we included the ability to reference database sources, specifically Microsoft SQL Server 2008 [10] . We also added PDP and PEP logic to our DVS. However, rather than reference an outside PIP, such as Windows Server Group Policy [11] , we chose to integrate policy information into the DVS as well. This decision was made for expediency, as the policies to implement are relatively simple, and security, as group policy objects are usually stored within the same Active Directory instance being compromised.
Tests were conducted on two different directory services instances, each comprising approximately 15,000 user objects created to simulate real-world implementations. For the Active Directory instance, we included four domain controllers to further simulate an actual production environment, as object creation and attribute modification is more difficult to detect across multiple domain controllers. Similarly, our SQL Server instance was hosted separately, to better simulate conditions such as connection speed and latency.
Our example implementation for the first scenario detected new accounts in the Active Directory domain, verified that no associated records existed in an authoritative SQL database, and therefore disabled the accounts. All unauthorized test accounts were detected, and in each test case, the sequence of events listed above occurred within one second of account creation.
Change Group Membership
While detecting a user addition is a relatively simple task, monitoring for object attribute changes, such as group membership, is more challenging, simply because of the large number of attributes describing each object. If the number of objects in the enterprise is also high, this task could become unwieldy. Fortunately, few attributes are likely to be considered sensitive enough to warrant monitoring. Usually only few attributes are utilized in making access control decisions, such as group membership, clearance level, citizenship, organizational status, or management level. Monitoring relatively few attributes, even across a large set of objects, is easily achievable using DVS.
Our second example scenario in Section 2.2.2 described an insider modifying the membership of a security group used to control access to privileged resources. Let us assume this security group is a domain administrators group. Let us also assume our organization has policies in place which limit the membership of this group to specific users, all of whom must have security clearances and be part of a specific organization. Finally, we limit the number of domain administrators in the group at any one time to three, and we will assume the group contains three accounts prior to the unauthorized addition. We can model this scenario as follows:
In this case, a auth admin is a condition that states the account is explicitly listed as a valid domain administrator in an authorized data source. a mbr org is the condition that the account owner is part of a specific organizational group in a separate authoritative data source. agrp size is the condition that three or less accounts exist in the domain administrators group. We then use MADE to monitor for and respond to discrepancies to this policy.
Again, the virtualization component collects and reports the object data to the synchronization component. In this case, object data not only refers to account information, but also to group membership in the domain administrators group. The PDP then detects the change to the group membership attribute on the unauthorized object. After consulting with the PIP and authoritative data source, the PDP determines the status of a auth admin and a mbr org to be false, specifically, that the object in question does not have proper authorization for the domain administrator group membership, nor does the account belong to a valid organization. Furthermore, the PDP would determine agrp size, that the maximum size allowed for this group has been exceeded. At this point, the PEP would be notified to take appropriate action. It is worth noting that in this case, the policy decision is not entirely based on information from authoritative data sources, but is also able to use information from the directory service itself.
Our implementation was further configured to perform the tasks listed above, specifically, monitoring for conditions in which an unauthorized account is added to a privileged group. Changes were detected and corrected in all test cases. Timing was similar to the previous scenario; corrections were made less than one second after an unauthorized change.
Utilizing Cross-Directory Relationships
The previous examples are fairly simple situations where a single directory service is compared to an authoritative data 
Figure 3: Virtualization of Multiple Data Sources into a Single View
source(s). However, to explore the true potential of this solution to detect insider activity, consider a more complex scenario which more fully utilizes the virtualization component: Our example organization contains two separate directory services instances, DA and DB that control access to different resources. Users are required to have matching accounts in both instances, and passwords are required to be synchronized across both directories. DA contains mandatory clearance level information, which is used to make access control decisions; DB contains mandatory management level information, which is used to make different access control decisions.
We will create an authorized account policy as follows:
Here, a clearance is the presence of the correct clearance level for the account, a mgmt lvl is the presence of the correct management level for the account, and a pwd match is the correct synchronization of passwords between domains.
In this scenario, the virtualization component takes data from both DA and DB and combines it together to form a single view of the user data. If different data exists for the same attribute in both locations, such as password hash, the virtualization component can either decide which to consider authoritative, or it can simply determine that a discrepancy exists, and notify the PDP directly of such a condition. Here, the authoritative data source is consulted for validation of a clearance and a mgmt lvl and the virtualization component provides validation of a pwd match . If any of these are false, such as in the third example presented in Section 2.2.2, where an attacker changes the password for a user in one of the directory services, then the conjunction fails, and the PDP notifies the PEP to take appropriate action.
The process of combining multiple data sources into a single view is illustrated in Figure 3 . Our implementation of this scenario virtualized accounts between instances of Active Directory and Sun Java Systems Directory Server, compared these to data in a Microsoft SQL database, and produced results very similar to the first two test scenarios.
DISCUSSION
The ability to monitor directory services for unauthorized changes is not a new contribution. Products and solutions exist to do this very task. The addition of a policy engine and the capability to make decisions on the validity of actions based on the combination of policy and authoritative data checking is somewhat novel, but is not a major breakthrough in insider detection.
The main contribution of this paper is based on bringing the unique characteristics of directory virtualization to bear on the challenge of detecting malicious insiders. Specifically, the ability to monitor multiple disparate data sources and present a single consolidated view of the combined data is the foundation upon which our solution is built. The combination of data allows us to view enterprise directory and data services as a whole, rather than looking at small individual pieces. While an insider may be able to manipulate a single system into providing unauthorized access, it is unlikely that all enterprise systems can be manipulated as well (at least not simultaneously). If a set of interdependencies and relationships can be defined which describe a healthy system, and a healthy user account, then they can also be used to detect when unauthorized changes have occurred.
Advantages of Directory Virtualization
The examples presented here are simplistic, to show the concept of our model. However, in production, directory virtualization is very powerful, with the ability to join many data sources into a single consolidated view. By defining relationships between authoritative sources, instances where data is required to be synchronized, and cases where data in one location is dependent on (and validated by) data in another location, a complex system view of an enterprise can be created.
As a practical advantage, virtual directories do not store data source information locally, in contrast to meta-directories, such as Microsoft ILM [9] or SunONE Meta-directory Services [22] . This allows for lightweight implementations, and furthermore allows for multiple instances to be deployed more easily. With many instantiations of directory virtualization spread across a network, monitoring directory services (and monitoring each other), disabling or defeating them becomes much more difficult for an administrative insider.
The location of the DVS outside the directory service also presents an advantage for detecting an insider that is technically savvy but not very familiar with the overall architecture of the enterprise. For instance, under normal circumstances, all changes to a directory service may be logged. A technically proficient insider may be able to defeat normal auditing mechanisms when making unauthorized changes, but unless the attacker is aware of the monitoring by the DVS, and can defeat that as well, the activity will still be detected. In this sense, our solution is a covert channel [13] to standard directory services implementations. A visual description of this concept is shown in Figure 4 . 
Attacks
Although our solution is capable of detecting insider activity across multiple systems in an enterprise, there are attack models that could still prevent successful detection. The most obvious occurs when an administrator also has control of authoritative data sources, or can disable the directory virtualization monitoring. Careful separation of duties can help mitigate these threats. Another possible attack occurs when an insider is able to modify multiple data sources quickly, and in precisely the correct way as to prevent the PDP from detecting that policy has been violated. This is more likely to be carried out by an administrator keenly aware of the monitoring capabilities of the system, and not by an outsider who has gained administrative access.
Application to Other Security Models
The directory services we present as examples in this paper all employ a discretionary access control model (DAC). However, insiders may also attack information in models such as mandatory access control (MAC) or role-based access control (RBAC) [20] . By monitoring for changes in information level or user level (MAC), or by detecting unauthorized changes in role, hierarchy, or privileges (RBAC), our solution can also be applied to detecting insider activity for these security models.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We presented a solution for detecting insider activity in enterprise systems using enhanced directory virtualization technology. The contributions of this work are threefold. First, we enhance the ability to do point monitoring of directory services to specific attributes and group memberships. Second, we strengthen this capability by adding a policy engine to core directory virtualization technology, enhancing the decision-making ability of these services in determining if activity is malicious. Finally, we demonstrate how to leverage the capabilities of directory virtualization to create a system-wide view of multiple directory services, establishing relationships between data sources, and providing a comprehensive viewpoint by which insider activity may be more easily detected.
Future work will include additional performance testing under real-world scenarios. Additionally, we seek to explore the deployment of many lightweight monitoring systems, based on our architecture, to better ensure insider activity will be detected. Finally, we intend to explore better interaction with various PIPs, what other types of systems could be used as PIPs, and determine how to prevent compromise of PIPs.
